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1. Introduction 
 
We analyze the linkage between tenant quality and the performance of commercial real estate 
using a sample of retail real estate investment trusts. We focus on retail REITs since the contracting 
mechanism associated with retail leases has several options such as percentage rents and co-tenancy 
provisions that are not found in leases for other property types. While the prior literature has 
focused on the former option whose use better aligns the incentives between the landlord and 
tenant, little if any research exists on the latter option which tends to mitigate this alignment in favor 
of the tenant(s).  The co-tenancy clause, relatively common in retail leases, allows tenants to demand 
reductions in rent or a penalty-free pullout if key tenants or a specified numbers of stores 
(occupancy threshold) leave the retail center. The rationale for this inducement clause is that the 
tenants rely on certain anchors or other national or regional tenants to draw customers to the center 
as well as a certain mix of tenants having similar customer demographics to increase sales. 
Consequently, while the co-tenancy clause complements the percentage rent clause in a good market, 
it can have a domino effect in turbulent economic times. An alternative way of thinking about this 
problem from a cash flow perspective is that while the percentage rent provides a floor for cash 
flows in a bad market, the co-tenancy provision lowers the floor. 
Given the current financial crisis, we explore the extent to which the co-tenancy provision 
exerts a greater influence on cash flows to the landlord relative to the percentage rent clause. Ex-
ante, it is unclear which option dominates if an anchor or key tenant departs from a center since this 
also affords the landlord with a growth option, the opportunity to adjust rents to market. If the 
landlord is able to lease the space to an equivalent anchor or one of higher quality, then the landlord 
should experience a positive stock market reaction. By higher quality, we mean that the key tenant 
generates more traffic and hence higher drawing power for the retail center and has an equivalent or 
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higher tenant credit rating. On the other hand, the common stock of a landlord should decline if the 
market perceives that the landlord is unable to re-lease the space and existing tenants thus take 
advantage of the co-tenancy option. To examine the abnormal returns of common stocks of REITs, 
we utilized the prior and post press release date data of public companies experiencing major tenant 
bankruptcies. In addition to those retailers under bankruptcy filings, there have been numerous store 
closings announced by retailers due to their strategic repositioning or unfavorable economic 
conditions. Regardless of the reasons of store closures, the impact to the landlords is much more 
severe than we have estimated. Because bankrupt stores will be closed without an attempt of 
restructuring under bankruptcy protection, we narrow down our focus to these cases since landlords 
do not receive any lease termination payments.  
We use an event study approach to investigate the impact of a major tenant’s Chapter 11 
bankruptcy filing on the landlord by observing the movements of the landlord’s stock. We find 
significant abnormal negative returns following the bankruptcy of a tenant in general which is 
consistent with the market perceiving that tenants will take advantage of the co-tenancy option 
although there are some situations where the growth option prevails.  The results are robust across 
various model specifications. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the location quality of landlord 
markets play an important role in determining whether the growth option exists. A landlord is 
defined to have a higher location quality, if its properties (malls or shopping centers) are located in 
markets that have more diversified economic base. A multivariate OLS regression shows that the 
abnormal returns are positively associated with location quality, conditional on the level of tenant 
exposure. The results are significant even after we control for firm level characteristics. 
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2. Hypothesis 
 
We study the impact of major tenant events on the stock performance of their landlord. In 
contrast to most real estate leases, which contract a fixed rental payment between landlord and 
tenant, retail tenants pay a percentage of their gross sales as rent in addition to the base rent. Past 
research has widely recognized that stores in shopping centers generate business traffic or sales 
externality among retail tenants, as costumers do “complimentary” or “comparison” shopping 
(Eaton and Lipsey, 1979 and Wolinsky, 1983). On one hand, a percentage rent provides a risk 
sharing mechanism for business uncertainty (Liceli and Sirmans, 1995) and better aligns the 
incentives between tenant and landlord (Brueckner, 1993 and Lee, 1995). On the other hand, the 
percentage lease contract creates business inter-dependence: a key tenant bankruptcy or store 
closures may significantly impact the performance of a landlord. The major tenant event may lead to 
the following effects. 
2.1 Direct effect from tenant revenue losses:  
Retail landlords suffer when a tenant files for bankruptcy, first losing rental revenue on the 
space the retailer occupies, then being forced to find replacement tenants. Such a threat to a 
landlord’s revenue can have an immediate impact on stock price of the landlord as evidenced in the 
following news examples:  
Developers Diversified Realty Corp., Kimco Realty Corp., General Growth Properties 
Inc. were among retail landlords that fell in New York trading after Circuit City Stores Inc. filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Developers Diversified, based in Beachwood, Ohio, fell 
$2.37, or 25 percent, to $7.25 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. New Hyde Park, 
New York-based Kimco Realty Corp., the largest U.S. owner of community shopping centers, fell 
$2.01, or 9.6 percent, to $19. Chicago-based General Growth fell 70 cents, or 34 percent, to 
$1.37. ---Bloomberg 11/10/2008 
 
Malan Realty Investors, Inc. (NYSE: MAL), a self-administered REIT, provided 
information today on its exposure to Kmart Corporation(NYSE: KM) and the potential impact of 
Kmart's bankruptcy filing on the Company's operating results for 2002. Malan has 27 properties 
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leased to Kmart and derives approximately 25 percent of its annualized base rents from Kmart. -
-- Malan Realty Investors, Inc. Press Release Jan. 22, 2002.  
Malan Realty Investors, Inc., …, said its board voted to sell the company’s 58 shopping 
center assets and liquidate the company. Malan, …,leases more space to the bankrupt retailer 
Kmart than all but two other real estate investment trusts. The company’s shares have fallen 43 
percent over the last 12 months.  ---the New York Times 3/21/2002 
 
 Depending on the exposure to the troubled tenants, the magnitude of the landlord’s stock 
market response may vary. A landlord with larger tenant exposure, i.e., higher percentage of revenue 
generated from the bankrupted tenant, will have a stronger response. A landlord with more 
diversified tenants will tend to be more resilient to shocks from any particular tenant.  
2.2 Re-tenanting and the growth option 
With a well-diversified tenant base, a landlord has only limited revenue exposure to the 
anchor tenant. Furthermore, a given regional mall may have more than 200 tenants but the most 
notable – the anchors – typically pay little, if any rent. Such anchors and other tenants with “brand” 
drawing power not only pay less base rent, but also tend to pay a lower percentage of their sales 
(Wheaton, 2000).  
Furthermore, store closures may benefit the landlord. Despite numerous big box store 
closings and chain liquidations, stronger retailers have been re-leasing several of the vacated 
locations as second-generation space. Retail landlord may take this opportunity to replace the below-
market rents contracted several years ago with new tenants who are in the expansion mode.  
For example, prior to 2009, Indianapolis-based HHGregg was a regional electronics chain 
that few shoppers had heard of outside of the Midwest. The chain saw the opportunity presented by 
the glut of big box space and took advantage of it to grow into a national player. Colliers 
International 2010 reports that HHGregg has opened more than 30 stores within the past 18 
months--and plans to open 45 more in 2011. The majority of these new locations formerly housed 
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failed electronics giant Circuit City. Other tenants actively signing leases recently include Kohl’s, 
Dollar Tree, Buybuy Baby, Express, and Giant, etc.  
Moreover, the termination of old leases not only grant the landlord an opportunity of 
marking the rents to market, but also provides some flexibility of keeping the growth option alive, as 
evidenced below.   
At neighborhood and community center REITs, strong leasing velocity at its centers 
resulted in a 30bps increase in occupancy to 94.5% over second quarter.  
Tanger was among those who lead the industry, producing an average increase on 
executed renewal of 18.3% compared to 13.6.% last year. The figure on new leases/re-tenanting 
is even stronger – a 43% increase in base rent over what the previous tenant was paying.  
Store closures at Tanger’s outlet centers seems to benefit the REIT, if it can keep up its 
pace of leasing. PREIT has provided some relief to retailers over the last quarter, granting 
underperforming retailers several short-term renewals at their current terms with the goal of 
maintaining occupancy in the near term while providing us the flexibility to re-lease these spaces 
in a more favorable economic environment.  
----CoStar Report 11/12/2008 
 
However, the retailers are selectively targeting the best available locations. This suggests that 
stores in the expansion mode will locate in areas with growing local economies to achieve sales 
growth. There continues to be demand for space in better quality locations, with more modest 
pressure on rents. Retail chains are capitalizing on the opportunity to upgrade by increasing their 
store size in the top malls. 
2.3 The contagion effect  
For most retail landlords, any particular tenant may only account for a small portion of total 
revenue that a landlord receives from other performing tenants. However, store closures and tenant 
liquidations still impact the landlord in a meaningful way due to the contagion effect, which refers to 
the adverse consequences of one firm’s action spreading throughout the industry. Extensive 
evidence exists of the intra-industry contagion effect of Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the stock market 
(Lang and Stulz, 1992, and Jorion and Zhang, 2007). For example, in 2002, the telecommunication 
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sector accounted for 56% of all corporate bankruptcies in terms of dollar debt defaulted. During the 
2007-2009 crisis, similar contagious bankruptcies occured in the financial industry. The explanations 
for the contagion effect include but are not limited to the following:  
1) Financial distress across companies is driven by common economic factors within the 
industry (Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007).  
2) The default of one firm causes financial distress on other firms with which the first firm 
has close business ties (Davis and Lo, 2001; Jarrow and Yu, 2001).  
3) Updating of beliefs, which arises when investors learn from other defaults. For example, 
the failure of Enron led investors to reassess their views of the quality of accounting information 
from other firms. (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege, 2003 and Giesecke, 2004). 
Generally, a “contagion effect” implies positive default correlations. A more relevant 
example in the retail industry is video rental stores. Immediately following reports that bankrupt 
retailer Movie Gallery (which also owns Hollywood Video) planned to liquidate its remaining 2000 
plus stores in early May 2010, shopping center landlords had the entire video rental segment on their 
watchlists. Later the same year, Blockbuster (another video rental store) filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy on September 23, 2010.  
2.4 Co-tenancy Amplification effect 
Even though the direct revenue loss from the bankrupt tenant is limited for a well-
diversified landlord, the failure of a key tenant may have an amplifying or domino effect due to the 
co-tenancy clause contained in many retail leases. The co-tenancy has long been a part of modern 
shopping center development and retail leasing strategies. The clause takes many forms, with some 
requiring a certain percentage of a shopping center to be leased and others naming specific retailers 
or categories that must remain open. The rationale supporting a tenant request is fairly simple: The 
tenant is relying on certain anchor tenants to be a draw for customers to visit the shopping center 
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and is expecting a certain tenant mix. The requesting tenant is counting on that business traffic to 
increase its visibility and sales.  
The risk created by the domino effect of lease terminations or reduced rent that might arise 
from a co-tenancy failure can be catastrophic. This ripple effect is especially a concern in turbulent 
times when it is hard to re-lease the space to other tenants. The bankruptcy of an anchor tenant may 
thus trigger a chain reaction of lease terminations of small retailers and thus lead to a collectively 
larger revenue loss to the landlord.  
 
3.  The Data and Descriptive Analysis 
We obtain our data from several sources.  
3.1 REIT firm and tenant data: 
We choose to study retail real estate investment trusts (REITs) since the retail REIT sector 
accounts for the majority of the retail real estate industry. Moreover, the financial information as 
well as tenant information is transparent. Table 1 lists all retail REITs used in this study including 
defunct firms. There are 73 firms in total, among which 32 are current REITs and 41 are historical 
REITs. We manually match the relation between landlord REITs and their tenants. REIT stock 
returns and REIT index returns between 2000 and 2010 are obtained from CRSP/Ziman database 
with corresponding REIT accounting data taken from Compustat and SNL. We obtain a list of top 
tenants of each REIT from SNL. The tenant information include the contractual relations between 
landlord REIT firms and their tenants, number of leases, percentage of revenue and percentage of 
square feet from each tenant. 
3.2 Public company bankruptcy filings:  
The Bankruptcy Research Database is obtained from http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm. 
The database includes all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed by or against a debtor group that: 1) Has 
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assets worth $100 million or more at the time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and 2) Is required 
to file 10-Ks with the SEC.  
There were 907 major public firms filing for chapter 11 between 1980 to 2010. Figure 1 
shows time variation of bankruptcy filings by industry. We select chapter 11 bankruptcy cases 
according the following rules: 1) Bankruptcy filed after 1999, as REIT tenant exposure information 
is not available prior to 2000, and 2) Lease real estate space from at least one REIT landlord before 
filing Chapter 11. Figure 2 demonstrates total number of bankruptcy filings across industry and 
across years in the sample. 
3.3 Private firm bankruptcy  
We manually collect historical private retailer bankruptcy from various industry reports: J.P. 
Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Colliers International, Costar, International Shopping 
Center Council, ULI, etc. The total numbers of defunct retailers vary by industry sectors (Figure 3) 
and the defunct department stores vary by states (Figure 4). From the 681 defunct retailers in the 
United States who have closed their doors since 1950, we match the private retailers that liquidated 
after 1999. We match the top tenants reported in SNL to identify bankrupt private retailers who 
were the top tenants of at least one publicly traded REIT. Table 2 contains 11 private retailers that 
went bankrupt after 1999, whose bankruptcies affected 20 REIT landlords.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
 
Our primary emphasis is on the announcement day effect, although we report measures of 
abnormal performance for various sub-periods between day -90 and day +30.  The impact of a 
major tenant bankruptcy announcement on the REIT’s stock price is estimated using abnormal 
performance over the event window.  We define the following timing sequence: event date, t=0, as 
the date of the tenant bankruptcy filing, event window as T1+1 to T2, and the pre-bankruptcy 
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estimation window as T0+1 to T1. The timing sequence is illustrated on the time line in Figure 5. We 
interpret the abnormal returns and volatilities over the event window as measures of the impact of a 
tenant bankruptcy event on the value of the REIT.  
4.1 The measurement of abnormal performance 
We present two types of evidence on abnormal returns following a tenant bankruptcy event. 
First, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after bankruptcy using different time 
horizons (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). Second, we present results using the buy-and-hold 
returns (BHARs), as it is a better method to calculate long-run abnormal return reflecting the 
compounding in long-run returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
CAR estimation: 
There are several return-generating processes used in the literature for calculating the return on a 
given security. The most commonly used approaches in the finance literature are 1) the constant 
mean return model, which calculates the abnormal return as the difference between realized return 
on security i in period t and its mean return for the same security over the normal performance 
period, (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985); and 2) The market model, which we describe in detail 
below. We present results for both the constant return model and the CAR model.  
We define the prediction error from the market model as the abnormal return. The daily 
prediction error PEit for each firm i on each event day t during the period of interest is estimated as  
 ( )ˆˆ ,it it i i miPE R Rα β= − +  
where  
itR ≡  the continuously compounded stock return of REIT i on day t; 
mtR ≡  the continuously compounded market return of CRSP/Ziman REIT index on day t; 
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ˆˆ ,  i iα β ≡  OLS estimation coefficients of market model regression. Parameters are estimated   
over 60 day period (-90 to -30) in the pre-bankruptcy event window.  
The prediction errors PEit  are averaged across the Nt firms in subsample on each event day t to 
form the abnormal return PEt  
 
1
1 .tNt iti
t
PE PE
N =
= ∑  
The average abnormal returns are cumulated from day -90 to +30 to form the CAR. The average 
prediction errors are also cumulated over various sub-periods to form the average abnormal returns 
for a given window. The statistic testing whether or not abnormal performance is significantly 
different from zero for a window of interest is based on the time series variance of the average 
prediction errors for 30 days from day 0 to day +30.    
In summary, the CAR estimate for a period of lengthτ is the sum of the average abnormal 
returns for the sample securities as in the following form:  
 ( )1i it ittCAR R E Rττ == −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑  
Depending on how the normal performance is measured, E(Rit) takes different forms. The constant 
return model uses the constant mean return for the specific security of interest while the market 
model uses the projected value from a market model regression.  
BHAR Estimation 
The cumulative abnormal return from the buy-and-hold strategy (BHAR) is calculated as the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in the firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in a 
portfolio with an appropriate expected return:  
 [ ] ( )1 11 1  .i it itt tBHAR R E Rτ ττ = == + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∏ ∏  
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We use the value weighted REIT index return Rmt as appropriate expected return instead of the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index return. The returns on three CRSP/Ziman indices - all 
REITs, equity REITs, and retail REITs - are used as benchmark returns in our BHAR estimation. 
Recent methodological studies disagree on the best method to calculate abnormal returns, (see 
for example, Barber and Lyon, 1997, and Fama 1998). However, it seems that both CARs and 
BHARs have their strengths and can be considered as complementary rather than competing 
approaches in computing abnormal returns (Dichev and Piotrosky, 2001). The difference between 
the CARs and BHARs results from the effect of compounding. CARs ignore compounding, while 
BHARs do not. If individual security returns are more volatile than the returns on the market index, 
CARs will be greater than BHARs. Ritter (1991) was among the first to argue that the CARs and 
BHARs can be used to answer different questions. 
4.2 Statistical tests of abnormal return 
To test the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns equal 
zero for a sample of N firms, we employ the following parametric test statistics: 
 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
,
,
i
CAR
i
CAR
t
Var CAR
τ τ
τ τ
=
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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( ) ( )
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Where ( ) ( )1 2 1 2,  and  ,i iCAR BHARτ τ τ τ  are the sample averages and ( )1 2,iVar CAR τ τ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ and 
( )1 2,iVar BHAR τ τ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ are the cross-sectional sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the 
sample of N firms over the window between 1 2to τ τ . If the sample is drawn randomly from a 
normal distribution, the two test statistics follow a Student t distribution under the null hypothesis.  
4.3 Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal performance 
In the results that follow, we employ multivariate regressions to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in the abnormal return in the post-bankruptcy periods. We are interested in what factors 
determine the cross-sectional variation of cumulative abnormal returns. Liu, Liu and Zhang (2010) 
provide the theory and evidence linking REIT value to its asset quality. They find that an asset’s 
tenant quality and location quality determine the firm value of a REIT. We predict that the size of a 
landlord’s exposure to distressed tenants will have a negative effect. The larger the percentage 
revenue of the REIT from the bankrupt tenant, the bigger the impact.  
Another significant determinant of REIT value is location quality. In our analysis, we 
measure the location quality using the average industry diversification ratio of a REIT's top markets. 
Each local market is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The United States Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) defines an MSA as one or more adjacent counties or county 
equivalents that have at least one urban core area of at least 50,000 population, plus adjacent 
territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by 
commuting ties. The OMB has defined 366 MSAs in the U.S. For example, the New York 
metropolitan area (the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island MSA), which is the largest 
MSA in the U.S., includes ten counties in New York State, twelve counties in Northern and Central 
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New Jersey, and one county in northeastern Pennsylvania. The idea is that REITs that operate in a 
market with a more diversified mix of industries may be in a better position to re-lease their space.  
To construct such a proxy, we first obtain the top ten markets for each REIT. Following 
Gibbs and Martin, (1962), for each MSA we calculate a Gibbs-Martin diversification index (GMI)1: 
2
1
21 ,( )
N
ii
i
E
GMI
E
== − ∑∑  
 Where Ei is the number of employees in each industry category of a particular MSA. Doing so 
makes it possible for us to measure the extent of local real estate market diversification and industry 
concentration. If the labor force is concentrated in a single industry, then the index is zero.  
Our hypothesis is that malls and shopping centers situated in better locations are less likely 
to be affected by the liquidation of their key tenants since an increased likelihood exists that the re-
tenanting growth option is in the money. Retail REITs whose properties are located in markets with 
a high GMI index (high location quality) will have a smaller negative effect (or even positive effect) 
to their stock performance following a tenant bankruptcy event.  
In summary, we run the following multivariate OLS regression:  
 ( )1 2 3( ) ( )  ,it tAR a b Location b Tenant b Controls ε= + + + +  
where 
ARit    ≡Cumulative abnormal return (CARs, and BHARs) for firm i over the window period; 
Location ≡ the location quality of a REIT, which is measure as average GMI of top MSAs; 
Tenant ≡ tenant exposure, measured as the percentage of revenue from the bankrupt tenant. The 
percentage of leased square feet is used, if the percentage of revenue is not available. 
 
Controls ≡ firm level control variables include size (measured as logarithm of book asset) and 
leverage ratio (measured as total debt over total capitalization). 
 
                                                 
1 Corgel and Gay (1987) study the Gibbs and Martin diversification index (GMI) to study the mortgage default 
probability across MSAs. The GMI equals one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
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We separately estimate CARs and BHARs for various post-event windows of interest 
including day 0 to day +1, 0 to day +2, 0 to day +5 and 0 to day +30. We expect the regression 
coefficients b1 and b2 to be positive and negative respectively.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 presents the average percentage of abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) (starting from -30 trading day before the event) for various trading day windows. 
The constant return model applies the mean of historical returns as the normal performance for the 
security of interest. The market model uses fitted values from a market model regression as normal 
performance.  Table 4 presents the percentage of cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(starting from -30 trading day before the event) for various trading day windows. The cumulative 
abnormal return from buy-and-hold strategy (BHAR) is calculated by the return on a buy-and-hold 
investment in the sample firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an 
appropriate CRSP/Ziman index.  
Figure 6 displays a visual representation of the cumulative abnormal returns. Even though CARs 
and BHARs are both negative and decreasing before the bankruptcy event window.Consistent with 
past event studies, the two-day event window contains the most significant cumulative abnormal 
return.  
Key statistics of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) are shown in Table 5 for various post-event windows following a tenant bankruptcy, with 
the event date as the date of the bankruptcy filing.  We define a 2 day return and a 5 day return as 0 
to +1, and 0 to +4, respectively. We use both the market model and the constant return model to 
estimate CARs while we use three REIT indices (All REIT, Equity REIT, and Retail REIT) from 
Ziman to estimate BHARs. The null hypotheses of no abnormal return at the post-event window 
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are strongly rejected across all model specifications. In contrast to previous event studies, which use 
pre-event variance estimation to form a t-test statistic, we utilize the post-event variance estimation 
to calculate t-statistics. As bankruptcy events create more uncertainty, one should expect the post-
event volatility to be greater than that of a pre-event window (we verify this subsequently). 
Therefore, our t-statistics avoid the problem of over-rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Table 6 reports a risk measure of REITs’ abnormal returns before and after a bankruptcy event 
for a major tenant(s). The risk dynamics is measured as the annualized volatility (or standard 
deviation) of BHAR for various event windows. Consistent across benchmark return measures, the 
volatility of abnormal returns in the post-bankruptcy window is much higher relative to the pre-
bankruptcy window. For example, the volatility for the -90 to -60 (pre-bankruptcy) window is 0.065 
with the volatility increasing to 0.070 for the 0 to +30 (post-bankruptcy) window.  
To investigate the cross-sectional differences in the abnormal returns in the post-event window, 
we run a multivariate OLS regression. Table 7 reports the regression results for CAR including both 
the market model and the constant return model (Panel A) and for BHAR (Panel B) across 1-day, 2-
day and 5-day post-event window.  Robust across several specifications, the location quality is highly 
significant with the right sign (positive). The coefficient on tenant exposure is negative, which means 
that a higher percentage of revenue from a bankrupted tenant will have a greater impact on the 
landlord, with negative consequences to the landlord’s stock price.  
We further investigate whether the abnormal responses of the landlord’s stock price to tenant 
bankruptcy are different for a public tenant compared to a private tenant. In an unreported 
regression result, where we include a dummy variable indicating public tenant bankruptcy to the 
regression with location quality and tenant exposure as repressors, we find that the public dummy 
variable is insignificant. Table 8 reports the results of 2-day post-bankruptcy abnormal returns for 
three separate regressions consisting of all tenants, public tenants, and private tenants respectively. 
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There is little (if any) difference between the public tenant sample and private tenant sample, 
conditional on the percentage exposure of the bankrupted tenant.  
To check the robustness of our regression results on landlord cross-sectional abnormal returns 
following a tenant bankruptcy, we included a few firm-level control variables. The first control 
variable is firm size measured as the logarithm of the landlord firm’s total assets. The second control 
variable is leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total debt to total capitalization. Table 9 provides a 
sample summary statistics and Pearson correlation matrix for the control variables. . We next add 
two firm level controls to the independent variables, location quality and tenant exposure. Table 10 
shows that the location quality and the tenant exposure remain significant and unchanged in sign, 
even after controlling for firm characteristics. The results also show that larger landlords or highly 
leveraged firms experience greater negative effects to tenant bankruptcies.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
          Given the current financial crisis, we explore the impact that tenant bankruptcies have on the 
risk and return performance of their publicly traded landlord. We focus on retail REITs since the 
contracting mechanism associated with retail leases has several options such as percentage rents and 
co-tenancy provisions that are not found in leases for other property types. Ex-ante, we argue that 
the performance of a landlord will depend on which option dominates given that a departure of an 
anchor or key tenant from a center affords the landlord with a growth option, the opportunity to 
adjust rents to market. If the landlord is able to lease the space to an equivalent anchor or one of 
higher quality, then the landlord should experience a positive stock market reaction.    
         To examine the abnormal returns of common stocks of landlord REITs, we utilize an event 
study approach with the focus on the prior and post press release date of companies experiencing 
major tenant bankruptcies. Although we find significant abnormal negative returns follow the 
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bankruptcy of a tenant in general which is consistent with the market perceiving that tenants will 
take advantage of the co-tenancy option, there are some situations where the growth option prevails.  
More specifically, we find that the location quality of landlord markets e.g., properties (malls or 
shopping centers) are located in markets that have more diversified economic base play an 
important role in determining whether the growth option exists. Abnormal returns are positively 
associated with location quality, conditional on the percentage of tenant exposure. The results are 
significant even after we control for firm level characteristics.
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Panel A: List of current REITs
Company Name Ticker Current Property Focus IPO Date
Assets 
(2010Q3)
Alexander's, Inc. ALX Yes Regional Mall 7/19/1984 1,717,662
CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. CBL Yes Regional Mall 10/27/1993 7,615,480
Feldman Mall Properties, Inc. FMLP Yes Regional Mall 12/15/2004 148,836
General Growth Properties, Inc. GGP Yes Regional Mall 4/8/1993 27,742,933
Glimcher Realty Trust GRT Yes Regional Mall 1/19/1994 1,741,615
Macerich Company MAC Yes Regional Mall 3/9/1994 7,699,522
Pennsylvania REIT PEI Yes Regional Mall 12/27/1960 3,093,861
Simon Property Group, Inc. SPG Yes Regional Mall 12/13/1993 24,788,287
Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO Yes Regional Mall 11/20/1992 2,529,676
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. SKT Yes Outlet Center 6/4/1993 1,197,559
Agree Realty Corporation ADC Yes Single Tenant 4/22/1994 274,057
Getty Realty Corp. GTY Yes Single Tenant 9/30/1971 428,108
National Retail Properties, Inc. NNN Yes Single Tenant 10/9/1984 2,609,755
One Liberty Properties, Inc. OLP Yes Single Tenant 12/20/1982 416,915
Realty Income Corporation O Yes Single Tenant 8/15/1994 3,285,534
Acadia Realty Trust AKR Yes Shopping Center 5/27/1993 1,490,748
Cedar Shopping Centers, Inc. CDR Yes Shopping Center 11/25/1986 1,647,104
Developers Diversified Realty DDR Yes Shopping Center 2/3/1993 7,877,079
Equity One, Inc. EQY Yes Shopping Center 5/13/1998 2,570,370
Excel Trust, Inc. EXL Yes Shopping Center 4/22/2010 318,230
Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT Yes Shopping Center 9/10/1962 3,127,159
Inland Real Estate Corporation IRC Yes Shopping Center 8/14/2002 1,232,183
Kimco Realty Corporation KIM Yes Shopping Center 11/22/1991 9,814,508
Kite Realty Group Trust KRG Yes Shopping Center 8/10/2004 1,133,219
Ramco-Gershenson Properties RPT Yes Shopping Center 5/31/1996 1,010,821
Regency Centers Corporation REG Yes Shopping Center 10/29/1993 3,993,674
Retail Opportunity Investments ROIC Yes Shopping Center 10/17/2007 428,304
Roberts Realty Investors, Inc. RPI Yes Shopping Center 12/9/1997 69,727
Saul Centers, Inc. BFS Yes Shopping Center 8/19/1993 970,464
Urstadt Biddle Properties Inc. UBA Yes Shopping Center 7/6/1969 548,926
Weingarten Realty Investors WRI Yes Shopping Center 8/16/1985 4,810,081
Whitestone REIT WSR Yes Shopping Center 8/25/2010 198,365
Table 1: List of Retail REITs
Table 1 lists all real estate investment trusts with property focus on retail real estate sector including regional 
mall, shopping center and others. Panel A lists all current REITs as of the year end of 2010. Panel B list all 
historical REITs. Information on IPO date, total asset as of 2010Q3 are obtained from SNL. 
Panel B: List of hostorical REITs
Company Name Ticker Current Property Focus IPO Date
Assets 
(2010Q3)
Arbor Property Trust - No Regional Mall 2/28/1994 NA
Crown American Realty Trust - No Regional Mall 8/9/1993 NA
DeBartolo Realty Corporation - No Regional Mall 4/14/1994 NA
EQK Realty Investors I - No Regional Mall 3/12/1985 NA
JP Realty, Inc. - No Regional Mall 1/13/1994 NA
Mills Corporation - No Regional Mall 4/21/1994 NA
Rouse Company - No Regional Mall 1/15/1957 NA
Urban Shopping Centers, Inc. - No Regional Mall 10/14/1993 NA
Chelsea Property Group, Inc. - No Outlet Center 10/26/1993 NA
Horizon Group Properties, Inc. - No Outlet Center 11/8/1993 NA
Horizon Group, Inc. - No Outlet Center 11/2/1993 NA
McArthur/Glen Realty Corp. - No Outlet Center 10/21/1993 NA
Prime Retail, Inc. - No Outlet Center 3/15/1994 NA
JDN Realty Corporation - No Power Center 3/29/1994 NA
Price REIT, Inc. - No Power Center 12/3/1991 NA
Aegis Realty, Inc. - No Shopping Center 10/10/1997 NA
AmREIT - No Shopping Center 7/23/2002 NA
Atlantic Realty Trust - No Shopping Center 5/14/1996 NA
Bradley Real Estate, Inc. - No Shopping Center 1/27/1961 NA
Burnham Pacific Properties, Inc. - No Shopping Center 1/15/1987 NA
Center Trust, Inc. - No Shopping Center 12/27/1993 NA
Excel Realty Trust, Inc. - No Shopping Center 8/4/1993 NA
First Washington Realty Trust, Inc. - No Shopping Center 6/27/1995 NA
Heritage Property Investment Trust - No Shopping Center 4/23/2002 NA
IRT Property Company - No Shopping Center 4/29/1971 NA
Konover Property Trust, Inc. - No Shopping Center 6/3/1993 NA
Kramont Realty Trust - No Shopping Center 12/29/1988 NA
Kranzco Realty Trust - No Shopping Center 11/12/1992 NA
Malan Realty Investors, Inc. - No Shopping Center 6/16/1994 NA
Mid-America Realty Investments, Inc. - No Shopping Center 12/30/1986 NA
Mid-Atlantic Realty Trust - No Shopping Center 9/11/1993 NA
MSA Realty Corporation - No Shopping Center 3/29/1984 NA
New Plan Excel Realty Trust, Inc. - No Shopping Center 7/1/1962 NA
Pan Pacific Retail Properties, Inc. - No Shopping Center 8/7/1997 NA
Philips International Realty - No Shopping Center 5/7/1998 NA
Price Legacy Corporation - No Shopping Center 12/21/1994 NA
Tucker Properties Corporation - No Shopping Center 10/5/1993 NA
United Investors Realty Trust - No Shopping Center 3/10/1998 NA
USP Real Estate Investment Trust - No Shopping Center 4/25/1978 NA
Western Properties Trust - No Shopping Center 6/13/1984 NA
Westfield America, Inc. - No Shopping Center 5/15/1997 NA
Private Retailer Defunct Date
Boscov's Department Stores LLC 9/4/09 Simon Property Group Inc.
KB Toys Inc. 2/9/09 General Growth Properties Inc. Pennsylvania REIT Acadia Realty Trust
Mervyns 7/21/08 Developers Diversified Realty Macerich
Steve and Barry's 7/9/08 General Growth Properties Glimcher Realty Trust  CBL & Associates  
Simon Property Group  Pennsylvania REIT  Macerich  
Goody's Family Clothing Inc. 6/9/08 Developers Diversified Realty
Linens 'N Things 5/2/08 Ramco-Gershenson Properties First Capital Realty Inc. EDT Retail Trust
Weingarten Realty Investors Kimco Realty AmREIT
Wickes Furniture Store 2/3/08 Inland Real Estate Corp.
Farmer Jack 7/7/07 Ramco-Gershenson Properties
CompUSA 5/14/07 Crescent Real Estate Equities Federal Realty Investment
Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. 12/28/00 Ramco-Gershenson Properties
Caldor Inc. 5/15/99 Alexander's Inc.
Table 2:Private Defunct Retailers
Landlord U.S. Public REITs
Table 2 lists private retailers that are defunct since 1999 and their landlord real estate investment trust at the time of bankruptcy 
announcement. 
AR CAR AR CAR
 -24 -0.483 -1.338 -0.241 -0.070
 -23 -0.041 -1.379 -0.338 -0.408
 -22 -0.701 -2.080 0.003 -0.405
 -21 0.411 -1.669 -0.123 -0.528
 -20 0.093 -1.576 0.281 -0.247
 -19 0.072 -1.504 0.241 -0.006
 -18 -0.784 -2.288 0.058 0.052
 -17 0.229 -2.060 -0.123 -0.071
 -16 0.134 -1.925 0.047 -0.025
 -15 -0.010 -1.935 -0.091 -0.116
 -14 -0.613 -2.548 0.045 -0.071
 -13 -0.722 -3.270 -0.635 -0.707
 -12 -0.710 -3.980 -0.154 -0.860
 -11 -0.129 -4.109 0.004 -0.856
 -10 -0.867 -4.976 -0.306 -1.162
-9 1.433 -3.543 0.125 -1.038
-8 -0.327 -3.870 0.176 -0.862
-7 0.361 -3.510 0.107 -0.755
-6 0.761 -2.749 0.168 -0.587
-5 -0.526 -3.275 -0.084 -0.670
-4 0.290 -2.985 -0.040 -0.711
-3 -1.042 -4.026 -0.351 -1.062
-2 -0.718 -4.745 -0.011 -1.073
-1 0.877 -3.897 0.097 -0.961
 0 -1.181 -5.060 -0.434 -1.411
+1 -0.314 -5.407 -0.321 -1.722
+2 -0.541 -5.912 -0.162 -1.890
+3 0.533 -5.378 0.131 -1.759
+4 -0.813 -6.192 -0.394 -2.153
+5 -0.210 -6.402 -0.169 -2.322
+6 0.314 -6.088 0.054 -2.268
+7 -0.889 -6.977 -0.261 -2.529
+8 -0.846 -7.824 -0.236 -2.765
+9 0.265 -7.558 -0.648 -3.414
 +10 1.412 -6.146 0.687 -2.727
 +11 -0.135 -6.281 0.208 -2.519
 +12 0.055 -6.227 -0.203 -2.722
 +13 -0.450 -6.677 0.101 -2.621
 +14 -1.108 -7.785 -0.641 -3.262
 +15 0.403 -7.382 0.003 -3.260
 +16 0.602 -6.781 0.135 -3.125
 +17 0.225 -6.556 0.487 -2.637
 +18 0.040 -6.516 -0.344 -2.982
 +19 1.818 -4.698 0.765 -2.217
 +20 -0.363 -5.061 -0.034 -2.251
 +21 -0.207 -5.268 -0.078 -2.330
 +22 -0.964 -6.232 -0.325 -2.654
 +23 1.195 -5.037 0.149 -2.506
 +24 -0.814 -5.851 -0.093 -2.599
Table 3: Average CARs under constant return model and market model
Table 3 presents the average percentage abnormal return (AR), cumulative abnormal return (CAR) (starting 
from -30 trading day before the event) for various trading day windows. The constant return model uses the 
constant mean of historical return as the normal performance for the security of interest. The market model 
uses fitted value from a market model regression as normal performance.  
Trading 
Days
Market ModelConstant Return Model
All REITs Equity REITs Retail REIT
 -24 -0.153 -0.104 0.001
 -23 -0.521 -0.463 -0.566
 -22 -0.367 -0.295 -0.363
 -21 -0.598 -0.479 -0.549
 -20 -0.549 -0.471 -0.403
 -19 -0.265 -0.115 -0.046
 -18 -0.082 0.028 0.102
 -17 -0.241 -0.092 0.015
 -16 -0.374 -0.173 -0.041
 -15 -0.312 -0.151 0.140
 -14 -0.300 -0.119 0.124
 -13 -0.683 -0.575 -0.338
 -12 -1.029 -0.875 -0.533
 -11 -0.824 -0.689 -0.255
 -10 -1.036 -0.856 -0.371
-9 -1.143 -0.953 -0.535
-8 -1.047 -0.875 -0.393
-7 -1.046 -0.869 -0.455
-6 -1.147 -1.013 -0.625
-5 -1.295 -1.127 -0.863
-4 -1.326 -1.114 -0.873
-3 -1.428 -1.271 -1.042
-2 -1.410 -1.233 -1.133
-1 -1.311 -1.157 -1.074
 0 -1.764 -1.504 -1.412
+1 -1.734 -1.570 -1.448
+2 -1.919 -1.722 -1.669
+3 -1.680 -1.489 -1.317
+4 -1.734 -1.527 -1.329
+5 -1.805 -1.606 -1.464
+6 -1.815 -1.604 -1.466
+7 -1.676 -1.459 -1.358
+8 -1.571 -1.392 -1.340
+9 -1.844 -1.653 -1.454
 +10 -1.791 -1.607 -1.504
 +11 -1.903 -1.702 -1.632
 +12 -2.174 -1.961 -1.901
 +13 -2.082 -1.870 -1.818
 +14 -2.110 -1.922 -1.848
 +15 -2.382 -2.195 -2.097
 +16 -2.512 -2.307 -2.138
 +17 -1.947 -1.804 -1.568
 +18 -2.447 -2.233 -1.999
 +19 -2.137 -2.012 -1.824
 +20 -2.060 -1.931 -1.808
 +21 -2.166 -2.037 -1.930
 +22 -2.252 -2.139 -2.107
 +23 -2.287 -2.184 -2.038
 +24 -2.216 -2.089 -1.989
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return
Table 4: Average BHARs under different benchmark indexes
Table 4 presents the percentage cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (starting from -30 trading day 
before the event) for various trading day windows. The cumulative abnormal return from buy-and-hold 
strategy (BHAR) is calculated as the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate CRSP/Ziman index.
Trading 
Days
N Market Model
Constant 
Return Model  ALL REIT  Equity REIT Retail REIT
-0.434 ** -1.181 *** -0.502 ** -0.393 ** -0.327 *
‐2.228 ‐3.819 ‐2.395 ‐1.990 ‐1.754
‐0.760 *** -1.510 *** -0.684 *** -0.666 *** -0.551 **
‐2.763 ‐3.427 ‐2.628 ‐2.595 ‐2.217
‐1.345 *** -2.523 *** -0.933 * -0.878 * -0.702
‐2.819 ‐3.330 ‐1.816 ‐1.724 ‐1.456
Event Date
0 to +1
0 to +4
161
159
161
CAR BHAR
Mean estimates of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns, their t-statistics (in the line below 
mean estimates), and number of observations are shown for various post-event windows following a tenant bankruptcy event. 
Event date is the date of bankruptcy filling. 0 to +1 is two day returns after the event; while 0 to +4 is 5 day cumulative return. 
CARs are estimated using both market model and constant return model. BHARs are estimated with three REIT indexes as 
expected return: all REIT index from Ziman, Equity REIT index and Retail REIT index. 
Table 5: Stock Price Response to Tenant Bankruptcy
Trading Days
Volatility Volatility
-90 to -60 0.065 ( 0.016 , 0.495 ) -90 to -30 0.048 ( 0.012 , 0.360 )
-60 to -30 0.067 ( 0.016 , 0.530 )
-30 to   0 0.069 ( 0.015 , 0.329 ) -30 to +30 0.050 ( 0.012 , 0.252 )
    0 to +30 0.070 ( 0.014 , 0.401 )
Volatility Volatility
-90 to -60 0.065 ( 0.016 , 0.495 ) -90 to -30 0.048 ( 0.012 , 0.358 )
-60 to -30 0.066 ( 0.016 , 0.526 )
-30 to   0 0.068 ( 0.015 , 0.323 ) -30 to +30 0.050 ( 0.012 , 0.251 )
    0 to +30 0.069 ( 0.014 , 0.398 )
Volatility Volatility
-90 to -60 0.065 ( 0.014 , 0.484 ) -90 to -30 0.048 ( 0.011 , 0.353 )
-60 to -30 0.068 ( 0.014 , 0.526 )
-30 to   0 0.070 ( 0.015 , 0.313 ) -30 to +30 0.050 ( 0.010 , 0.240 )
    0 to +30 0.070 ( 0.013 , 0.381 )
Table 6: REIT risk dynamics before and after major tenant bankruptcy
Table 6 reports a risk measure of REIT stock abnormal return before and after a bankruptcy event of REIT's major 
tenants. The risk dynamics is measured as the annualized standard deviation of BHAR for various windows. 
Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility dynamics
(Benchmark to equity REITs)
Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility 
(Benchmark to all REITs)
Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility dynamics
(Benchmark to equity REITs)
Range Range
Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility dynamics
(Benchmark to retail REITs) Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility dynamics
(Benchmark to retail REITs)
Range Range
Trading 
Days
BHAR return volatility dynamics
(Benchmark to all REITs)
Range Range
Panel A: CAR
Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value N
+1 ‐1.951 ‐2.12 0.036 ** 2.141 2.11 0.036 ** 160 0.02
+1 ‐2.393 ‐2.60 0.010 ** 2.629 2.60 0.010 ** ‐0.067 ‐2.64 0.009 *** 160 0.06
+2 ‐2.952 ‐2.37 0.019 ** 3.238 2.36 0.020 ** 160 0.03
+2 ‐3.270 ‐2.58 0.011 ** 3.590 2.58 0.011 ** ‐0.048 ‐1.38 0.169 160 0.03
+5 ‐1.891 ‐1.48 0.140 2.076 1.48 0.141 160 0.01
+5 ‐2.261 ‐1.75 0.082 * 2.485 1.75 0.082 * ‐0.056 ‐1.57 0.118 160 0.02
+1 ‐3.027 ‐1.74 0.083 * 3.316 1.74 0.085 * 160 0.01
+1 ‐3.275 ‐1.85 0.066 * 3.591 1.85 0.067 * ‐0.038 ‐0.77 0.442 160 0.01
+2 ‐3.646 ‐1.84 0.068 * 3.993 1.83 0.069 * 160 0.01
+2 ‐3.744 ‐1.85 0.066 * 4.102 1.84 0.067 * ‐0.015 ‐0.27 0.790 160 0.01
+5 0.097 0.06 0.952 ‐0.114 ‐0.07 0.948 160 0.01
+5 ‐0.078 ‐0.05 0.962 0.079 0.04 0.965 ‐0.026 ‐0.59 0.555 160 0.01
Table 7: Cross‐sectional analysis of abnormal performance of landlord stocks 
following a tenant bankruptcy during various post‐event periods
Adj.
R^2
CAR 
market model
CAR
constant return 
model
Trading 
Days
Intercept Location Quality Tenant Exposure
Panel B: BHAR
Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value N
+1 ‐2.187 ‐2.31 0.023 ** 2.399 2.30 0.023 ** 160 0.03
+1 ‐2.605 ‐2.74 0.007 *** 2.861 2.74 0.007 *** ‐0.063 ‐2.41 0.017 ** 160 0.06
+2 ‐2.660 ‐2.30 0.023 ** 2.917 2.29 0.023 ** 160 0.03
+2 ‐2.986 ‐2.55 0.012 ** 3.278 2.54 0.012 ** ‐0.049 ‐1.53 0.129 160 0.03
+5 ‐4.588 ‐2.05 0.042 ** 5.035 2.04 0.043 ** 160 0.02
+5 ‐4.536 ‐1.98 0.049 ** 4.977 1.98 0.050 ** 0.008 0.13 0.900 160 0.01
+1 ‐1.698 ‐1.90 0.060 * 1.864 1.89 0.060 * 160 0.02
+1 ‐2.136 ‐2.39 0.018 ** 2.347 2.39 0.018 ** ‐0.066 ‐2.69 0.008 *** 160 0.05
+2 ‐2.491 ‐2.18 0.031 ** 2.732 2.18 0.031 ** 160 0.02
+2 ‐2.817 ‐2.44 0.016 ** 3.092 2.43 0.016 ** ‐0.049 ‐1.55 0.124 160 0.03
+5 ‐4.280 ‐1.92 0.056 * 4.697 1.92 0.057 * 160 0.02
+5 ‐4.232 ‐1.87 0.064 * 4.644 1.86 0.065 * 0.007 0.12 0.908 160 0.01
+1 ‐1.390 ‐1.64 0.103 1.525 1.64 0.103 160 0.01
+1 ‐1.849 ‐2.20 0.029 ** 2.033 2.20 0.029 ** ‐0.069 ‐3.00 0.003 *** 160 0.06
+2 ‐2.026 ‐1.81 0.072 * 2.222 1.81 0.073 * 160 0.01
+2 ‐2.381 ‐2.11 0.037 ** 2.615 2.10 0.037 ** ‐0.054 ‐1.72 0.087 * 160 0.03
+5 ‐3.972 ‐1.86 0.065 * 4.361 1.86 0.065 * 160 0.02
+5 ‐4.126 ‐1.90 0.060 * 4.532 1.89 0.060 * ‐0.023 ‐0.39 0.698 160 0.01
BHAR 
all REITs
BHAR 
equity REITs
BHAR 
retail REITs
Trading 
Days
Intercept Location Quality Tenant Exposure Adj.
R^2
Panel A: CAR
Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value N
all ‐1.951 ‐2.12 0.036 ** 2.141 2.11 0.036 ** 160 0.02
all ‐2.393 ‐2.60 0.010 ** 2.629 2.6 0.010 ** ‐0.067 ‐2.64 0.009 *** 160 0.06
public ‐1.866 ‐1.78 0.077 * 2.047 1.78 0.078 * 140 0.02
public ‐2.363 ‐2.25 0.026 ** 2.597 2.25 0.026 ** ‐0.065 ‐2.39 0.018 ** 140 0.05
private ‐2.460 ‐1.98 0.064 * 2.703 1.97 0.064 * 20 0.13
private ‐2.503 ‐2.26 0.037 ** 2.756 2.27 0.037 ** ‐0.397 ‐2.42 0.027 ** 20 0.32
all ‐3.027 ‐1.74 0.083 * 3.316 1.74 0.085 * 160 0.01
all ‐3.275 ‐1.85 0.066 * 3.591 1.85 0.067 * ‐0.038 ‐0.77 0.442 160 0.01
public ‐3.781 ‐1.98 0.050 ** 4.148 1.97 0.050 * 140 0.02
public ‐4.207 ‐2.16 0.033 ** 4.619 2.16 0.033 ** ‐0.055 ‐1.1 0.271 140 0.02
private 1.519 0.44 0.663 ‐1.703 ‐0.45 0.657 20 0.04
private 1.577 0.46 0.650 ‐1.775 ‐0.47 0.643 0.533 1.05 0.308 20 0.04
Table 8: Cross‐sectional analysis of abnormal performance of landlord stocks 
following a tenant bankruptcy by sample of public tenant bankruptcy and prive tenant bankruptcy
Sample
Intercept Location Quality Tenant Exposure Adj.
R^2
CAR 
market model
CAR
constant return 
model
Panel B: BHAR
Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value Estimate t Value p Value N
all ‐2.187 ‐2.31 0.023 ** 2.399 2.3 0.023 ** 160 0.03
all ‐2.605 ‐2.74 0.007 *** 2.861 2.74 0.007 *** ‐0.063 ‐2.41 0.017 ** 160 0.06
public ‐2.186 ‐2.02 0.045 ** 2.398 2.02 0.046 ** 140 0.02
public ‐2.671 ‐2.46 0.015 ** 2.934 2.45 0.015 ** ‐0.063 ‐2.25 0.026 ** 140 0.05
private ‐2.184 ‐1.96 0.066 * 2.398 1.96 0.066 * 20 0.13
private ‐2.201 ‐1.97 0.066 * 2.419 1.97 0.066 * ‐0.155 ‐0.94 0.362 20 0.12
all ‐1.698 ‐1.90 0.060 * 1.864 1.89 0.060 * 160 0.02
all ‐2.136 ‐2.39 0.018 ** 2.347 2.39 0.018 ** ‐0.066 ‐2.69 0.008 *** 160 0.05
public ‐1.613 ‐1.58 0.116 1.770 1.58 0.117 140 0.01
public ‐2.122 ‐2.08 0.039 ** 2.332 2.08 0.040 ** ‐0.066 ‐2.52 0.013 ** 140 0.05
private ‐2.222 ‐1.97 0.064 * 2.440 1.97 0.065 * 20 0.13
private ‐2.240 ‐1.98 0.064 * 2.462 1.98 0.064 * ‐0.165 ‐0.98 0.339 20 0.13
all ‐1.390 ‐1.64 0.103 1.525 1.64 0.103 160 0.01
all ‐1.849 ‐2.20 0.029 ** 2.033 2.2 0.029 ** ‐0.069 ‐3.00 0.003 *** 160 0.06
public ‐1.320 ‐1.37 0.173 1.449 1.37 0.174 140 0.01
public ‐1.857 ‐1.94 0.055 * 2.042 1.94 0.055 * ‐0.070 ‐2.82 0.005 *** 140 0.05
private ‐1.818 ‐1.70 0.107 1.996 1.69 0.108 20 0.09
private ‐1.830 ‐1.68 0.111 2.011 1.68 0.111 ‐0.109 ‐0.68 0.507 20 0.06
Adj.
R^2
BHAR 
all REITs
BHAR 
equity REITs
BHAR 
retail REITs
Sample
Intercept Location Quality Tenant Exposure
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Location 
Quality
Tenant 
Exposure Size Leverage
Location Quality 160 0.909 0.002 0.903 0.913 Location Quality 1 0.183 0.067 -0.113
Tenant Exposure 160 3.648 7.829 0.000 60.000 Tenant Exposure 0.183 1 -0.574 -0.330
Size 160 14.501 1.248 9.835 17.202 Size 0.067 -0.574 1 0.180
Leverage 160 49.039 17.749 0.000 97.800 Leverage -0.113 -0.330 0.180 1
Table 9: Summary statistics and correlation matrix
Summary Statistics Pearson Correlation Matrix
Panel A: CARs
Location Quality 3.238 *** 3.590 *** 3.733 *** 3.993 *** 4.102 *** 4.814 ***
( 1.372 ) ( 1.392 ) ( 1.394 ) ( 2.181 ) ( 2.225 ) ( 2.194 )
Tenant Exposure -0.048 *** -0.111 *** -0.015 *** -0.162 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.069 )
Size -0.003 *** -0.010 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 )
Leverage -0.111 *** -0.162 ***
( 0.044 ) ( 0.069 )
Intercept -2.952 *** -3.270 *** -3.330 *** -3.646 *** -3.744 *** -4.210 ***
( 1.248 ) ( 1.265 ) ( 1.260 ) ( 1.983 ) ( 2.023 ) ( 1.984 )
Adj R-Sq 0.028 0.034 0.078 0.015 0.009 0.083
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
CAR Two-Day Return 
Market Model
CAR Two-Day Return
Constant Return Model
Table 10: Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal performance of landlord stocks 
following a tenant bankruptcy with firm level controls
Panel B: BHARs
Location Quality 2.917 *** 3.278 *** 3.726 *** 2.732 *** 3.092 *** 3.531 *** 2.222 *** 2.615 *** 3.052 ***
(1.273) (1.289) (1.288) (1.256) (1.272) (1.267) (1.23) (1.244) (1.252)
Tenant Exposure -0.049 *** -0.126 *** -0.049 *** -0.127 *** -0.054 *** -0.121 ***
(0.032) (0.041) (0.032) (0.04) (0.031) (0.04)
Size -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage -0.126 *** -0.127 *** -0.121 ***
(0.041) (0.04) (0.04)
Intercept -2.660 *** -3.295 *** -2.491 *** -2.817 *** -3.117 *** -2.026 *** -2.381 *** -2.691 ***
1.157 (1.164) (1.142) (1.156) (1.145) (1.119) (1.131) (1.131)
Adj R-Sq 0.026 0.034 0.083 0.023 0.032 0.085 0.014 0.026 0.062
N 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
BHAR Two-Day Return
Retail REIT index
BHAR Two-Day Return
All REIT index  
BHAR Two-Day Return
Equity REIT index  
Figure 1: Bankruptcy filing distribution by year 1980 - 2010
Figure 1 presents historical Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the United States filed during 1980 - 2010. The data is from bankruptcy research 
database (BRD) compiled by professor Lynn M. LoPucki at UCLA law school. BRD contains all chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed by companies that 
1) have assets worth $100 million or more at the time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and 2) are required to file 10-ks with the SEC. The total 
number of bankruptcy fillings are further decomposed by industry: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Communications and utility, 
Whole sale, Retail trade, Finance, insurance and real estate, and Services. 
Panel A: Public tenant bankruptcy by industry
Panel B: Public tenant bankruptcy by year
Figure 2: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Fillings by REIT Public Tenants 1999-2010
Figure 2 presents the total number of bankruptcy cases fied by public tanants of REITs during 1999 to 2010.
Panel A is percentage of chapter 11 filings by industry. Panel B is total number of bankruptcy fillings by year.
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Figure 3: Defaunct Retailers in the U.S. 1950 - 2010 by Industry
Across the United States a large number of local stores and retail chains became defunct between the 1950s, when modern shopping centers were 
introduced, and the 1980s, when many chains were either consolidated or liquidated. Some have been lost due to mergers. Figure xxx lists defunct 
retailers of the United States by industry. Source: Wikipedia.
Figure 4: Defunct Department Stores in the U.S. by State
Figure 4 presents the number of defunct department stores of the United States by state. The stores on this list 
range from small-town one-unit stores to big city mega-chains that have disappeared over the past 100 years, 
including both traditional department stores and discount stores. Many department stores went out of business 
or lost their identities between 1990 and 2005 as the result of a complex series of corporate mergers and 
acquisitions that involved Federated Department Stores and The May Department Stores Company and that 
resulted in many stores becoming units of Macy's, Inc. This list excludes 86 department stores that involved with 
Federated and May. Source: Wikipedia.
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Figure 5: Time Line for Bankruptcy Event Study
Figure 5 illustrates the timing sequence of the event study. The event date is defined as the date of 
bankruptcy filling of a public tenant.
0
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Filed Date
T1=-30 T2=+30T0=-90 T3=90
t
Figure 6 presents the abnormal returns averaged across the 160 observations following the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filling of a major 
tenant. The solid line plots the cumulative abnormal return and the dashed line plots the buy-and-hold abnormal return. 
Figure 6: Average Abnormal Return Following Tenant Bankruptcy
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